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DI/USAF CONTRIBUTIONS TO NIE-50

"THE CURRENT SITUATION AND PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN

GERMANY THROUGH 1952"

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B. The Eastern German "Air Force"

1. What is the present status of the Eastern German Air Force?

The Soviet Zone of Germany has no air force similar to the air forces which exist in the satellite countries. However, reports received indicate that cadres of politically reliable East German youths and former Luftwaffe pilots and crews are being organized and trained to form an Air Police Force.

In January 1951, it was confirmed that an East German Air Police Headquarters (Hauptverwaltung Luftpolizei - HVL) had been established. It is now located on the Johannisthal airfield at the southern edge of Berlin. This headquarters, staffed by between 100 to 130 officers and enlisted men, is still largely concerned with planning, recruiting and the preparation of tables of organization. The evolution of the HVL into an Air Force has been much slower than expected and the many reports received indicating formation and activation of flying units have not been confirmed. For instance, as early as February 1950, all Volkspolizei schools and alert police units were ordered to compile lists of all flying personnel formerly in the Luftwaffe. This activity indicated the preparation of plans for the implementation and rapid expansion of an East German Air Force camouflaged as an Air Police Organization.

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To date however, personnel strength is estimated at not higher than 6000. There may be more than one reason for this lack of growth but the possibility is not precluded that the greater portion of the training is conducted on jet fighters in the USSR away from observation. Such a secret training operation could accomplish several purposes:

- (1) Lull the West Germans into a false sense of security and therefore support West German reluctance to rearm.
- (2) Increase the feeling that the Soviets are sincere in claims that they will not rearm the East Germans, as contrasted to Western plans, but will instead work towards unification of a free and neutral Germany.
- (3) Contribute to the development of a "Volunteer" force for use in the Far East in the event that the Soviets have reassessed the mission of the Air Police due to developments in the Korean war.

Paratrooper Instructions

It has been reported but not confirmed, that paratrooper training has been given certain HVL detachments. One such detachment is said to have completed training in June 1951 and the graduate students have been chosen to instruct paratrooper classes in the following schools: WITTENBERG, PRITZWALK, WITTSTOCK, and GARDELEGEN.

Central control of all paratroop instruction reportedly is to be located at WITTSTOCK and known as ABTEILUNG I.

Unconfirmed reports also indicate that a second paratroop detachment, ABTEILUNG II, located at GARDELEGEN was activated 1 June 1951.

2. Could a skilled and reliable air force be created by the end of 1952? Are there indications that such a program is contemplated or in progress?

If intensive training is and has been conducted in the USSR for young, well indoctrinated Eastern Germans and a refresher course, conducted for ex-Luftwaffe personnel, a skilled air force could be created by the end of 1952. Its reliability however would be doubtful. Since the occupation of Germany by the Soviets there has been an increased feeling of anti-communism. The hatred and sometimes fear of the Germans for their former enemy, now their master, combined with present occupation policies of non-fraternization and the nationalistic pride of the German are factors not conducive to reliability. At the present time there is no indication that such a program is contemplated or in successful progress. However it is inconceivable that the Kremlin would allow the development of the Air Police Force to practically stop in the face of rearmament of West Germany.

3. What would be the role of such an air force?

If such an air force is created it is estimated that it may eventually be integrated into the Soviet Air Force, thereby increasing the fighting trained manpower reserve of the Kremlin.

Should a peace treaty restoring a unified German state and providing for the withdrawal of all occupation forces become a fact, the role of such an air force could be to support Communist efforts to control Western Germany.

In the event that the Soviets decide to use East German forces to drive the Allied powers from Western Berlin, an East German Air Police could be utilized for: (1) support of ground forces; (2) active

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interference with the Air Corridor.

D. Soviet Forces Stationed in Eastern Germany

1. Have there been significant changes in the size, quality, or capabilities of the Soviet Forces stationed in Eastern Germany?

The Soviet 24th Tactical Air Army stationed in the Soviet Zone of Germany appeared to be approaching the final stage of converting its fighter strength to jet aircraft this fall. All 18 fighter regiments had disposed of their conventional fighters and were approaching full strength in jet aircraft. The estimated total Table of Equipment strength was 660 fighter aircraft and the number of jet fighters observed on Soviet Zone airfields had steadily increased during the summer from about 450 on 1 March 1951 to almost 600 in September. The re-equipment program has been accompanied by an extensive training program, which has included night flying and air-to-air and air-to-ground gunnery exercises. During October, however, an extensive shifting of air units was reported. Jet aircraft and personnel of three fighter divisions were reported involved in movements, possibly out of Germany. Jet aircraft subsequently have been reappearing on five of the six airfields which had been occupied by two of these divisions. Also aircraft crates and personnel have recently been observed on trains coming to German airfields from the Soviet Union. So far it has not been possible to reach a conclusion as to the significance of the aircraft movements in Eastern Germany. It is possible that increments have been sent in to replace departing better-trained elements or to build up newly-created

units from nuclei left behind. It is also possible that elements which left the fields might be returning in connection with what could have been a large scale movement exercise. The present evidence still indicates, however, that at least one of the three fighter divisions may have moved out of Germany. There also have been reports indicating other jet fighter regiments have shifted bases in Germany. Reports also indicate that some ground attack regiments were involved in a change of base.

The introduction of the new Type 27 twin-jet light bombers into two bomber regiments stationed in the Soviet Zone as replacement for piston-engined light bombers has been observed in the past several months. It appears that three, and possibly four, light bomber regiments and one reconnaissance regiment are in the process of being re-equipped with the Type 27 bomber. The appearance of this aircraft in Soviet Zone units represents a significant increase in bombing capabilities.

The sighting on German airfields of IL-4 aircraft, which often are associated with Long Range Aviation, has also been reported. The sighting of these aircraft, considered in connection with the extensive airfield construction program in the Soviet Zone, may be an indication that the stationing of Long Range Aviation units in the Soviet Zone is contemplated.

A number of recent reports have indicated a trend toward a

significant increase of POL storage facilities in the Soviet Zone. One report indicates that the Soviet fuel dump at Schleife has had its storage capacity increased by more than 500,000 gallons with the installation of eighty additional tanks. This would raise the fuel capacity of this dump to more than six million gallons. There have been reports of the enlargement of other storage facilities.

2. Is there evidence that the withdrawal of all or part of these forces is contemplated? Is there evidence that the increase of these forces is contemplated?

The discussion of the first question has generally answered this question. Whatever may be involved in the shifting of jet fighter divisions mentioned above, the reappearance of jet aircraft on some of the fields and the arrival of personnel and aircraft crates may be an indication that the Soviets probably intend to maintain much the same air strength in the Soviet Zone that has existed in the past. The introduction of Type 27 light jet bombers, the sighting of IL-4 light bombers, the extensive airfield construction program and the enlargement of POL storage facilities support this view. Although it cannot be said now that present evidence indicates contemplated increase of present forces, the airfield and POL storage programs would be logical steps in that direction.

3. Has the USSR made significant improvements in airfield facilities in Eastern Germany?

An extensive airfield construction program has been underway in the Soviet Zone. In addition to extension of existing runways and construction of new long runways, a widespread program of rehabilitation and construction of airfield service facilities including night landing and navigational aids is being pursued. Eastern Germany at present has twenty-three airfields with runways of 6,000 feet or more, at least seven of which are suitable for sustained heavy and medium bomber (B-29 Type) operations. Completion of current construction at seven other airfields is expected to provide additional runways with a minimum of 6,000 feet, some of which will be 8,000 feet or more.

E. Additional Indications of Probable Soviet Courses of Action

1. What is the significance of Eastern Germany's failure to have mutual defense agreements with the USSR and with other Satellites?

The USSR has consistently claimed that Eastern Germany has no military forces, therefore there could not be mutual defense agreements with the USSR or with its satellites.

A mutual defense agreement between East Germany and the USSR, or between East Germany and the satellite nations, would mean acceptance by the USSR of a status quo in Germany, perpetuation of a divided Germany and the possibility that Western Germany would eventually be included in NATO and rearmed.

Instead the USSR wants to use East Germany as a lever to induce a united Germany, hold general elections and then as alleged champions of such unification, sign a pact with the new Germany. This would be

the first step towards obtaining entire control since an unarmed West Germany would be an easy prey to an armed communist-led Eastern Germany.

2. Have there been indications of a shift or revision in emphasis in either Soviet long-term or immediate objectives for Eastern Germany and for Germany as a whole?

The long-term Soviet objective with respect to Germany, namely, to obtain control of all Germany and fit it into its proper place within the plans of the Kremlin for world conquest, and its immediate objectives, namely, to continue its policy of consolidation and firmer control of East Germany and to use East Germany as a lever for achieving its objectives in West Germany remain unchanged. However, tactical moves or temporary retreats are to be expected.

3. Do Soviet policy or shifts in Soviet policy in Eastern Germany provide indications concerning probable Soviet courses of action elsewhere?

Eastern Germany is assigned a primary role, with a target, basically offensive, of a united Germany, rearmed and controlled from Moscow. Germany's industrial potential, technical knowhow, natural resources and geographic location are prerequisites in the creation of a Soviet power position from which the Kremlin can expect to be successful in its aspirations to dominate the world.

4. Are there other indications of probable Soviet courses of action regarding Eastern Germany?

The present political maneuver and statements by East German communist leaders provide ample indications of the Kremlin's intentions to use East Germany as a tool for eventual seizure of all Germany under Moscow control and to prevent the rearmament of West Germany.

In October 1950 representatives of the USSR, its Satellites, and the GDR, meeting in Prague, Czechoslovakia, issued a statement charging the West with a policy of aggression in Germany, and making a four-point demand. (1) The four occupying powers should proclaim their intention not to permit remilitarization of Germany or her inclusion in any aggressive plans to implement the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement. (2) All restrictions on German peacetime economy should be lifted, but the restoration of German war potential should be prevented. (3) A peace treaty restoring a unified German State and providing for withdrawal of occupation forces within one year of its conclusion should be concluded immediately and (4) An all-German constituent council, based on equal representation between Eastern and Western Germany, should be formed to prepare an all-German Government and to consult with the occupying powers in preparing a peace treaty. In certain circumstances the German people may be directly consulted on this proposal. In September 1951 the Kremlin reintroduced the Prague declarations through East German spokesmen indicating that the objectives for Germany had not been abandoned.

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